Russian Energy Exports and Fuel Prices in Africa

The Middle East shock has been in effect since February 28, and on July 8 it was compounded by Russia’s ban on diesel exports, introduced in response to Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries and domestic fuel shortages. Exports had already been falling before the ban: according to Kpler, diesel and gasoil loadings in the first ten days of July were about 234,000 barrels per day, compared with an average of about 817,000 in 2025. The ban formalized an already shrinking supply.

This matters for Africa because, after the EU ban on Russian petroleum products, Russia became one of the region’s main suppliers: it shipped 3.4 million tonnes of diesel and gasoil to West Africa in 2025. Journalists and analysts note that African markets were among those most sensitive to the ban. The ban also came on top of the fact that a significant share of global supply had already been restricted.

According to S&P Global Energy CERA, Tunisia and The Gambia sourced almost 70% of their gasoil from Russia, Senegal 61%, and Ghana 52%. Gasoil prices in West Africa rose by more than 50%, while shipments from Russia to Africa, which had been about 330,000 barrels per day in June, fell sharply. Egypt and Morocco were also among the buyers: according to the Kyiv School of Economics, Russia accounted for 32% of Morocco’s diesel and gasoil imports and 24% of Egypt’s [Kyiv School of Economics. Russian Oil Tracker — July 2026. The Russian volumes were only partially replaced: India added about 34,000 barrels per day to West Africa, while North Africa received a further 16,000 from the Indian Nayara terminal.

Nigeria was an exception: according to S&P, the Dangote refinery helped avert acute shortages in Nigeria itself and in neighboring Ghana. This shows that domestic refining can act as a buffer against external disruptions.

The shock is transmitted through the usual chain: oil, diesel, transport, wholesale prices, food. Diesel matters because trucks, generators, farm equipment, and fishing vessels run on it, so higher diesel costs quickly feed into the price of goods. I don’t have direct inflation data linked specifically to the Russian ban, but indirect signs are evident. In Senegal, diesel prices have risen by 69% since the start of the Middle East conflict, and in August the authorities raised the price by a further 75 CFA francs per liter. S&P analysts warned that food inflation could emerge with a lag, while high energy prices are forcing African central banks to keep interest rates elevated and making borrowing more expensive.

Transport costs are rising in two ways: diesel itself is becoming more expensive, and buyers have to source cargoes from farther away and pay more for freight and logistics. A CERA analyst noted that governments in countries with price caps may sign exclusive contracts with traders and pay a premium to guarantee supplies.

Governments are cushioning the blow with subsidies, shifting the risk to public budgets and debt. Senegal budgeted for oil at $85 per barrel, but has already spent more than 245 billion CFA francs on price support since the start of the year, using up nearly the entire annual allocation. According to the government, if prices continue to rise, subsidy spending could exceed 1.15 trillion francs. In The Gambia, the diesel subsidy was nearly 30 dalasi per liter in April. In Cameroon, the cost of diesel imports rose by more than 60% from February to May. A higher import bill puts pressure on the external balance, especially in countries facing foreign-currency shortages, while subsidies become a form of hidden debt. I could not find a quantitative assessment of the impact of the Russian factor on balance-of-payments figures specifically.

The ban has been extended through January 31, 2027, but as of September 1, Russian producers were once again allowed to export diesel. In October, the U.S. issued OFAC License No. 135, authorizing transactions involving Russian diesel through April 7, 2027. According to Le360, this does not guarantee that additional volumes will go to Africa: countries in the region will have to compete for them with buyers in Europe and the United States. Therefore, the “price stabilization” mentioned in the topic’s headline is so far a possible scenario rather than an observed fact.

Russia’s ban has intensified pressure on African fuel markets, but its impact on inflation and the balance of payments depends on a combination of factors: the Middle East shock, subsidies, and access to alternative suppliers. Countries with domestic refining capacity and diversified supply contracts are better positioned.

Author: Assistant Professor, Department of World Economy and International Finance, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Rafael Mulenga.